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AbstrAct: Modern developments in the neurosciences raise a number of ethical issues, not always discussed in a dispassionate way. The most 
pressing interest lies in the fact that ‘neuroethics’ condenses an interdisciplinary scientific-philosophical reflection. Encouraged by neuroe-
thics, new data on brain function promote a review of neuroethical “actus humanus”, and a new vision about anthropological dualism. One of 
the main implications of contemporary advances in neuroscience is the awareness that traditional philosophical questions are not able to give 
a good foundation for valid moral discernment. Moreover, neuroethics has a magic charm not just for ethical deliberation, but the cases that 
fall within its jurisdiction include some of the most controversial and strange issues, such as the question of dualism. Since Neuroethics, as a 
“neuroscience of ethics”, clarifies the constraints of human action, we can easily understand that the more we know about these conditioning 
factors the more we are able to affirm and justify the limits of ethics in neuroscientific knowledge. Faced with this dichotomy challenges, how 
do we justify ethics in the neurosciences? The link that we propose in the article is to make a synthesis of the “brain of the ethics” and the 
“ethics of the brain”.
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resumo: Os desenvolvimentos modernos das neurociências levantam um número de questões éticas nem sempre discutidas de um modo imparcial. 
O interesse mais urgente reside no fato de a ‘neuroética’ condensar uma reflexão científica e filosófica interdisciplinar. Estimulados pela neuroética, 
novos dados sobre a função cerebral promovem uma revisão do “actus humanus” neuroético e traz uma nova visão sobre o dualismo antropológico. 
Uma das implicações principais dos avanços contemporâneos da neurociência é a consciência de que as questões filosóficas tradicionais não são capa-
zes de fornecer um bom fundamento ao discernimento moral válido. Além disso, não só a neuroética tem um encanto mágico para a deliberação ética 
como os casos que estão incluídos em sua jurisdição envolvem algumas questões mais controversas e estranhas, como a questão do dualismo. Como a 
Neuroética, na qualidade de “neurociência da ética”, esclarece as restrições da ação humana, podemos facilmente entender que quanto mais sabemos 
sobre esses fatores condicionantes, tanto mais capazes somos de afirmar e justificar os limites da ética no conhecimento neurocientífico. Diante do 
desafio dessa dicotomia, como justificamos a ética nas neurociências? A conexão que propomos no artigo é fazer uma síntese entre o “cérebro da ética” 
e a “ética do cérebro”.
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INtroductIoN 
Modern developments in neuroscience raise a 
number of ethical issues, not always discussed in a 
dispassionate way. The most pressing reason for this 
conceptual dyslexia lies in the fact that ‘neuroethics’ 
condenses an interdisciplinary scientific-philosophi-
cal reflection. 
A primary indicator of the importance of neurosci-
ence is that our brain is the “booster” of our body, and 
guides intellectual activities such as language, recognition 
of forms, or resolution of problems.
Jean-Didier Vincent defines the brain as “the land 
of the self ’s body”. We can say “I” because we have a 
brain that feels everything that happens in the body and 
through the body1. 
This short introduction will shock all those who 
do not recognize the dichotomy between “body” and 
“mind”, and the consequent dissociation from the “or-
ganic” and “neuronal” approaches. Two distinct path-
ways discriminate between “organic” and “neuronal” 
perspectives: From the brain to the thinking and from 
the thinking to the brain2.
On each of these approaches the brain is not a “sub-
stance” separate from the body or some miraculous soft-
ware that controls the machine. The brain is the centre 
of our world. 
Jean-Didier Vincent, in his book “Voyage extraor-
dinaire au centre du cerveau”, tells us a little story that 
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shows us the direct relationship between thought and lan-
guage as expression of thought.
One day, Vincent’s grandfather bought a parrot. 
The street merchant told him that the parrot spoke 
“like a big boy”. Days, weeks passed, and nothing! 
The parrot definitely didn’t say a word! Angry because 
he felt cheated, he asked the seller to take the bird 
back. On arguing, the shrewd salesman threw the fol-
lowing argument: “It does not speak, but it thinks.” 
Without getting the money back, he returned home 
with the parrot.
By the end of his life, Vincent’s grandfather com-
mented that he had learned a great lesson in neuro-
science from that uneducated seller. That parrot truly 
“spoke”, because it distracted him from the chatter of 
his wife, who spoke without ever having had a signi-
ficant thought. 
the mAgIc chArm of the brAIN 
We all know that the main business of neurosci-
ence implicates three sorts of areas: nervous system, 
neuronal work, and the importance of cells called glial 
cells or neuroglia. Although the aim of this paper is 
not to understand the mechanisms of memory, or how 
emotions are generated, or the mechanisms of neuro-
degeneration that occur in diseases such as Alzheimer’s 
and Parkinson’s, such processes of the brain are a major 
reason why the development of the neurosciences is 
associated with concerns about the quality of life as 
people age. The extension of average life expectancy 
means an increase in the number of new cases of de-
generative diseases which compromise the quality of 
life, particularly because there is still no cure for these 
complex diseases.
The need for neuroscience to handle assorted 
themes, and interdependent ones, at the same time, 
leads us to discuss the concept of the mind and its dis-
orders. Besides the complexity of neural connections, 
the debate is not just in the neuroscience fields, (such 
as psychiatry, psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology), 
but also in sociology and theology. It spills over into 
areas without social boundaries, through education, 
family and religion. 
from neuroscience to neuroethics: the problem 
of consciousness 
Neuroethics considers the impact of neurosci-
ence, in the context of philosophy and ethics. Thus, 
neuroethics becomes an interpretive key to a holis-
tic view of humanity. Sometimes we believe that we 
have broken the old dualism of body and soul just by 
replacing “soul” by “brain”, as if the brain were not 
part of our body and, first and foremost, the key of 
our lifetime.
Encouraged by neuroethics, new data on brain func-
tion prompt a review of “the sense of self ”3, without lead-
ing to a “solipsist” view of reality. The implications for 
society of the growing knowledge about brain function 
are another aspect that must be taken into account in the 
current debate.
Despite science and philosophy proposing different 
ways of studying consciousness, there is a growing con-
sensus, at least in two respects:
1. The “primary consciousness” is a cognitive process 
that emerges from a complex neural activity;
2. The distinction between two types of conscious-
ness, arising at different levels of neural complexity, as 
higher-order consciousness and reflective consciousness.
These points of convergence contain philosophical 
perspectives that shape new neuroscientific interpreta-
tions. Among them we can summarize the four models 
of thought:
1. Neuro-reductionist. This model is the most 
traditional one, and the proponents are figures such 
as Patricia Churchland and molecular biologist 
Francis Crick4. It reduces consciousness to neural 
mechanisms. Crick explains how consciousness re-
duces the activity of neurons, but also states that 
conscious experience is an emergent property of the 
brain as a whole;
2. Neurofunctional. This model is called “functional-
ism”. It advocates that the preservation of mental states 
is defined by their “functional organization,” namely by 
moulds from causal relationships in the nervous system. 
Functionalists are not Cartesian reductionists, because 
they pay careful attention to the Nervous System Non-
linear Phenomena5. 
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3. Neuro-dualism. For this model, consciousness 
is a deep mystery which human intelligence will never 
understand. The cause of these limitations is an irre-
ducible duality, which in practice means that there is 
nothing other than the classical Cartesian duality be-
tween mind and matter.
4. Neurophenomenology. This is a method of 
studying consciousness which combines the disci-
plined examination of subjective experiences with the 
analysis of models and corresponding neural process-
es. According to Michel Renaud, phenomenology, 
heiress of the discoveries of the modern philosophy 
of subjectivity, has had, and continues to have, a con-
siderable impact on our awareness and understanding 
of the world.
To understand the complex body-consciousness, 
contemporary neuroscience finds in Damasio’s think-
ing the attempt to explain the origin and sense of self 
as a central element of consciousness and shows that 
this effect is related to the ability of the human brain 
to allow individuals to perceive themselves as living or-
ganisms.
Damasio, from the example of the Phineas Gage 
case, concluded that the human mind has the ability to 
perceive the existence of an interaction between body 
and environment, and that it can react based on facts 
that the body harvests through sensations, perceptions 
and emotions.
Attempting to respond to this change, Dama-
sio suggests a link between body, consciousness and 
identity. The body is the point of convergence of the 
various relationships and the place where emotions are 
built. Perceived as the gathering point, human con-
sciousness becomes a “biological advantage” related to 
life support and, at the same time, the certainty that 
we share with other animals the same sense of belong-
ing to the world. Damasio’s argument is thus a strong 
attempt to bridge the Cartesian dualism, to clear the 
continuity between body and consciousness and the 
body’s role in world knowledge.
Moral decision comes from some kind of con-
viction about certain facts. While it is true that the 
ethical consideration is founded on a set of intuitive 
moral demands – not only on considerations of bio-
logical genetics – it is therefore true that knowledge 
of certain facts derived from experience and scientific 
research may help to clarify some of our ethical and 
moral content. 
NeuroscIeNce ANd ANthroPology 
One of the main implications of contemporary ad-
vances in neuroscience is realising that traditional philo-
sophical questions are not able to give a good foundation 
for valid moral discernment.
If we observe the great dream that guides neurosci-
ence or genetic engineering, we can see that these “new 
life sciences” seek to uncover the channels through 
which vital information becomes human. The need for 
moral values and moral education about the serious 
implications of science and technology in vital areas 
is a universal and very urgent concern, with a special 
relation between ethics and teaching, and a mutual in-
fluence between education and morality. The human 
being is, by nature, a moral being, but must be edu-
cated to morality. The natural behaviour of humans is 
egocentric (Piaget), in the sense that the first human 
impulse is for individual needs to take precedence and 
guide people’s actions. 
Neuroethical “actus humanus”
Freedom, as an expression of the human being, has 
the power to convert the natural world in a world of ar-
tefacts. The main task of ethics is to provide guidance for 
full freedom.
The history of philosophical thought provides us 
with a variety of interpretations of ethical motivations 
and perspectives that underpin their foundations and 
ideals. In ancient Greece we find in Aristotle’s ethics a 
relationship based on equity associated with the good 
of mankind; St. Augustine has fixed the ethics on the 
basis of the relationship of love; Kant conceived the 
ethics of respect; in contemporary thought, respect, 
love, justice and dignity took the name of “anthro-
pocosmic solidarity”. On this holistic view of ethics, 
neuroethics becomes a new scientific field, which, by 
the uniqueness and interest of its object of study is 
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not only an important sub-section of ethics, but also a 
fascinating branch of ethicsa. 
It is accepted by all the specialists that William Safire 
introduced the term “neuroethics” in 2002 when he used 
it in an article in the New York Times6, but, in fact, Safire 
recognizes that the term existed before. Going beyond 
this controversy, the date of 2002 is most significant. 
Early in the new millennium we are witnessing an unruly 
development of new issues raised by the advance of the 
science of the mind.
The term “neuroethics” has two interesting interpre-
tations in hermeneutics: the path that leads from ethics 
to neuroscience, and, secondly, the way from neurosci-
ence to ethics. Although that hermeneutic understanding 
could appear to be a mere play on words, the clarification 
of this distinction makes sense. 
Neuroscience ethics concerns the field of neuroeth-
ics that seeks to develop an interpretive framework to 
regulate the advances in neuroscience and its applica-
tion to humans; on the other hand, neuroscience of eth-
ics concerns the scientific assessment of the neurological 
effect on the ethical choice itself. On this vector there is 
a primary emphasis on the neuronal base of the moral 
agents. From that point of view, neuroscience aims to il-
luminate the key elements that shape human action, the 
freedom of will, the ability to reflect, and the evaluation 
of our actions.
The discovery of the neurological basis of moral 
action can be considered an essential tool for a dif-
ferent understanding of human action, for it enables 
the perception of what can be understood as “actus 
humanus”. The interface between the brain and ac-
tion, seen in neuroethics, illuminates the self-ability 
to control actions, with the exception of those which 
are unpredictable.
When we look into the very essence of humanity, 
neuroethics assumes a central significance. No matter 
how important other branches of ethics are, we can 
never reach the ground of the neurological conditions 
that underpin the justification of ethical choice in the 
other areas of operation. The branch of neuroethics is 
the science which deals with precisely this anthropo-
logical background.
Because the “neuroscience of ethics” clarifies the 
constraints of human action, we can easily under-
stand that the more we know about these condition-
ing factors the more we are able to affirm and justify 
the limits of ethics in neuroscientific knowledge. Al-
though it may seem that these perspectives are com-
pletely diverse, we can justify the need for a neuro-
science ethics. Neuroscience can help make essential 
progress on neuroscience ethics. 
Founded in the advances of science, neuroethics 
is not just a branch of applied ethics, but occupies a 
prime position since it illuminates the human activity 
and the rationality of freedom and choice. Neuroethics 
is therefore much more than a branch of the applica-
tions of ethics. 
the neuroscience input in dualism
Neuroethics is not just essential to unravel delib-
erations in ethics. Neuroethics is fascinating: the cases 
that fall within its jurisdiction include some of the 
most controversial and strange issues, such as the ques-
tion of dualism.
Even though we do not intend to present a com-
prehensive review of the theme of dualism, it is im-
portant to note that, as an immemorial philosophical 
concept, the first use of the term starts in a research 
paper entitled “Historia religionis veterum Persarum”7 
by Thomas Hyde. From the perspective of the Persian 
religion, this book contemplates the intensity of the 
deities Hormuz and Ahriman, who symbolize Light 
and Darkness, Good and Evil. Hyde holds that dual-
ism embodies the history of philosophy in opposition 
to monism, developed by Spinoza. (From Spinoza’s 
point of view, the spiritual and material phenomena 
are attributes of an underlying substance).
Throughout the history of philosophy dualism was 
considered an abstract approach between two irreconcil-
able tendencies: good and evil, matter and spirit, body 
and soul, one and multiple, freedom and determination, 
subject and object.
a. Consider the case of Antonio Damasio, “Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain: The Evolution of Consciousness”, in just over one week it sold 10,000 copies. 
The issue is quite complex and certainly only a small group of specialists will be able to understand the book. This publication success is very much related to the attractiveness 
of  neuroscience.
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For centuries, the issue of the link between “body” 
and “soul” was described as a religious phenomenon 
or, at the best, a spiritual fact. In consequence, this 
connection was studied and defended by theologians 
and spiritual thinkers and denied by all thinkers called 
“materialists”. 
Currently, the approach is made from a neuroscien-
tific perspective. More than a theory that explains soul/
body dualism, it is presented as a principle of reality un-
derlying a type of relationship that is antithetical and ir-
reconcilable: this most fascinating form is the relation-
ship between brain and mind2.
The basis of dualism is the perception that the 
mind cannot be reduced to a physical substance, but 
is another non-physical substance. The truth is that, 
for many people, mental issues such as beliefs, feel-
ings, or desires, can be explained by physical terms. 
On the other hand, others may say that almost ev-
erything will be explained in physical terms, as for 
example subjective feeling, or the fact that we have 
conscious experiences.
Although permeating the entire history of Western 
thought, it is in modern philosophical thought that 
dualism invaded philosophy under the baton of 
Descartes. After the author of the “Discourse of a 
method for the well guiding of reason, and the discovery 
of truth in the sciences”, we witnessed several attempts 
(more or less bizarre) to solve the main problem raised 
by him: the problem of causal relationship between 
mind and body. To Descartes, mind and body are two 
distinct substances. The mind is the res cogitans and 
the body is the res extensa. 
In this passage we can clearly contemplate the Car-
tesian dualism where the mind is indivisible and more 
easily known than the body which by virtue of being in 
space is divisible. Despite this dualism, even in Descartes’ 
time, the interaction between mind and body was not 
considered as a final solution.
In addition, Spinoza advocated a different phi-
losophy of mind based on an ontological model: the 
order and connection of ideas is the same as the or-
der and connection of things. Mind and body are not 
two different substances, but two different attributes 
of the same substance. This substance unit is named 
“God”. Substance thinking and substance extended 
are one and the same, comprehended through one at-
tribute or through another8. This connection helps 
to understand the relationship he sees between mind 
and body. 
One of the most interesting attempts to respond 
to the Cartesian dilemma is Nicolas Malebranche’s 
Occasionalism. On the Treaty of nature and grace, of 
1680, the theory is held that all activities of the soul 
that seem to cause effects on the body and all the “ac-
tions” of the body on the soul are, in fact, caused by 
God’s occasional will. Malebranche believed in the 
existence of two distinct substances, an extensive and 
a thinking substance.
However, one problem remains in all these forms 
of dualism: the problem of mental causation, where 
the roots of thinking are. Without an answer to the 
problem of causality, dualism does not seem a viable 
alternative. 
The development of neuroscience, particularly brain 
mapping, brought with it the impossibility of ignoring 
the study of the biological activity of the brain1. In fact, 
the relationship between thought and the brain is one 
of the greatest expressions of the applicability of anthro-
pological dualism, because through the mind, the body 
is not an object. So, the main problem lies precisely in 
the concept of identity between sensitive body and lived 
body, the perception of body as a self. This “self ” is the 
meeting point between these two realities separated by an 
artificial approach. 
Although this question remains valid and without 
a complete answer, one of the most exciting answers 
lies in Damasio’s thought. Dialoguing with Western 
cultural heritage, Damasio is trying to unravel the 
“Descartes’s Error”9, and to discover the “Feeling of 
What Happens”3.
According to Damasio, consciousness is a natural 
and biological phenomenon which emerges in living 
creatures which have a certain degree of complexity. 
This idea is not original, but what is innovative is 
that Damasio submits a detailed development of this 
idea by firmly founded experimental data, and by 
various speculations, eminently scientific in the sense 
that they are likely to be tested empirically. Thus, the 
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identity of self results from the identity of the body 
in the same way that consciousness itself arises from 
the need to regulate the biological body.
Consequently, consciousness is the result of the 
need to regulate any biological organism. What’s 
amazing in any organism is the fact that internal body 
states do not show large variations. This is the body 
homeostasis: if the internal body state of an organism 
exceeds certain values,  it dies. In contrast to this in-
ternal constancy we notice the inconstancy and vari-
ability of the environment. Consequently, organisms 
have to maintain very accurate forms of internal regu-
lation, in connection with information received from 
the exterior. Simplifying the explanation of this phe-
nomenon, we can say that consciousness (extended or 
nuclear) arises from the need to simplify the process of 
internal regulation.
the solutIoN of the mINd 
Time is lost in the speculative work done by phi-
losophers and thinkers about the nature and structure 
of the mind. Throughout this process, the history of 
thought has developed a set of distinctions and ap-
proaches that now present themselves as indispensable 
to illuminate the theme of ethics in general and, in our 
case, of neurosciences in particular.
Although aware that we need to sit on “the shoul-
ders of giants”10 of culture, we must not forget that philo-
sophical reflection must be supplemented by empirical 
research. Besides, modern empirical advances could im-
prove philosophical reflection. 
The mind, as a state of consciousness or sub-con-
sciousness that allows the expression of nature11, is 
quirkier than many of us could conceive, because we 
all accept that there is a lack of data in neuroscience. 
In the middle of this “unknown strange marvel” that 
is the brain we have two ways of reality perception: the 
conscious way and the unconscious way.
Scientifically considered, understanding the 
function of the brain is often problematic, since we 
see the human weakness: everything we value (as sen-
sual experience, art, literature), and that makes us 
valuable (especially our independence) depends on 
the continued integrity of this delicate and infinitely 
complex organ.
Faced with such complexity, neuroscience leads 
us to a kind of humility. When we understand the 
copious ways and procedures that filter our external 
information, we perceive how poor our introspective 
knowledge is. A lot of what happens around us hap-
pens in the inside area of the mind, and cannot be 
looked at closely, at least not directly. The mind is the 
guardian of our inner world1. 
Humility, influenced by knowing the limits of in-
trospective knowledge, should make us less confident of 
scientific experience and memory. The real triumph of 
neuroscience would be to make us aware of “how” we can 
discover: using correct methods, and relying on the struc-
ture of science as a basis of knowledge, we can understand 
not only the world but also the experience of ourselves. 
 the neuroscience of ethics
When we consider ethical problems, we are led to 
believe that ethical decision is conditioned by a set of 
factors external in nature, such as culture, personality 
and environment. This interpretation, which seems 
clear and distinct, is refuted by some thinkers who 
argue that mind sciences are gradually revealing that 
we cannot continue to have so rigid an insight. Neu-
roscience and social psychology show that our ethical 
judgments are often (or maybe always), unjustified 
and unreasonable.
Although it could appear that neuroscientific ad-
vances could come to give a hand to some theories that 
support the universality of ethical values, the truth is that 
these sciences destroy the illusion of the same impersonal 
universality.
According to a revisionist view, the lesson of mind 
sciences is that all moral theories are based on irrational-
ity. On this point of view, some authors argue that mind 
sciences provide decisive support for the defence of tradi-
tional ethical reasoning.
From another perspective, some authors advocate an 
eliminationist vision, where mind sciences show that all 
moral theories are unwarranted.
Faced with this dichotomy, how do we value eth-
ics? From Neil Levy’s point of view, the challenge of 
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neuroscience in ethics focuses on the concept of intu-
itionb. Neurosciences show that moral intuitions are 
reliable, at least in some circumstances. But here lies 
the biggest problem: if our moral intuitions are sys-
tematically unreliable, then moral thinking is, at bot-
tom, a moral intuition. 
ethics and Intuition
Ethical thinking advocated by John Rawls13 influ-
enced radically the focus of ethical foundation. Rawls ar-
gues that the validation of moral theories could be found 
on “reflective equilibrium”c.
So, what is intuition? There is no universally ac-
cepted definition. Some philosophers identify intellec-
tual intuition with appearances: an irrevocable impres-
sion imposed because of a circumstance which may or 
may not cause a corresponding belief14.
From a moral point of view, intuitions are often char-
acterized as “gut feelings”d. This definition implies a mis-
leading perspective, for it suggests that intuitions lack a 
cognitive content. Damasio’s research on somatic markers 
indicates that the content is guided by a set of somatic 
responses such as skin and heart rate which indicate that 
an activity has been intensified. 
Perceiving (as intuition) that an action is right or 
wrong is not necessarily the same as believing that an 
action is right or wrong. This distinction implies that 
it might be quite possible that people can have moral 
intuitions that do not conform to their moral beliefs 
(similar to the optical illusion). However, the moral in-
tuitions are usually considered to have strong probative 
value. Intuitions have the force of self-justification. In-
tuitions play an important role in many research areas. 
According to Rawls13, moral theories are related to the 
intuitive nature of perceptions. But what kind of prin-
ciple can explain moral judgments?
Two philosophical movements dispute this reason-
ing. One is the Utilitarian. According to Bentham, the 
greatest benefit for the greatest number is the measure of 
right and wrong. An action is correct when it produces 
more happiness than any alternative.
Another principle is the Consequentialist. This is a 
principle that is based on the appreciation of the action 
by its consequences. 
In front of the arguments that disparity can jus-
tify, or not, the choice for one or another model, 
the search for “reflective equilibrium”, lies in find-
ing an underlying set of principles that harmonize. 
Although it may seem strange, balance lies in intu-
ition, understood not as sacred or esoteric, but it is 
a possibility that a moral principle is so intuitively 
plausible that, when it conflicts with an intuition of a 
particular case, it must maintain the principle rather 
than modify it.
Some utilitarians, like Peter Singer16, suggest that 
this moral theory avoids reliance on intuitions, reject-
ing them as irrational prejudices, or as products of a 
cultural doctrine. However, it is clear that utilitarian-
ism itself is as dependent on intuitions as any other 
moral theory.
Singer rejects intuitions in favour of “self-evident 
moral axioms”. The problem in this sentence is that self-
evidence is in itself an intuition. Therefore, the appeal to 
self-evidence is an appeal to intuition. Hereby, the prob-
lem for utilitarianism is based, for example, on the intu-
ition that pain and pleasure are, respectively, good and 
bad.
No moral theories seem to be able to dispense with 
intuition, although some give more weight to casuistic 
intuitions17; others, such as utilitarianism, rest the justifi-
cation for moral choices in a great intuition, the particu-
lar moral principle18. Whatever the ideological options 
could be, all moral theories seem to be based on moral 
intuition.
In their most radical form, the challenge of the moral 
intuitive choice is based on this fact: if our intuitions are 
reliable guides of moral truths, then all moral theories are 
in trouble.
b. Intuition is the act by which the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. When using only intuition, the truth of the proposition is immediately known 
the moment it is presented12. 
c. According to John Rawls, reflective equilibrium has the role of establishing consistency between the agents of particular moral judgments and ethical principles established in 
this case, the principles of justice, as in a procedural schema guiding rules for action moral, so as to establish the complementarity between the political culture of a democratic 
society and the normative ideal of person and well-ordered society.
d. The word is usually reserved for the conscious subjective experience of emotion15.
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coNclusIoN 
It is unquestionable that the researches of neuroscien-
tists – as the researches of others – are not performed in a 
neutral way, because they are influenced by institutional 
interests and economic, political or religious orientation. 
Sometimes, the frivolous way in which discoveries in 
neuroscience are published mean they reach the public 
as self-evident and thus have a strong potential to cause 
jumping to conclusions.
The problem of consciousness, which for centuries 
has been the exclusive domain of philosophy, has become 
a subject of scientific research. Theories about the physi-
cal nature of consciousness, defended for example by 
Damasio, try to demonstrate how consciousness is built 
into the human brain. The route of the physical nature of 
consciousness, especially understood by neuroscience as 
synaptic activity19, is presented as a strategy for improving 
scientific and philosophical understanding about mental 
phenomena. We cannot ignore this process.
Since the brain gives us the sense of morality, 
providing us with the skills to live in society, it is 
not possible to enter a discussion about ethics and 
switch on philosophical discussions about rights, 
duties, justice and morality without a strong neu-
rological basis. 
Throughout this article we have drawn attention to 
the complexity of understanding the moral act insofar 
as it is interfered with by measurable and immeasurable 
phenomena. This evaluation makes us believe that neuro-
scientific research about ethics opens the door to a better 
humanity.
Humanity results not only from a very complicated 
combination of genes and neurons, but also from experi-
ences, values, learning and the influence of socio-cultural 
life. Each of us is a mystery to himself. Neuroscience can 
help us understand a number of elements that make up 
the mystery, but do not eliminate it. It is up to neuro-
ethics to monitor and reconcile scientific advances with 
human dignity.
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